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Introduction
 
Discounting is a mathematical procedure for adjust-
ing future costs and outcomes of health-care inter-
ventions to “present value”; essentially this means
adjusting for differences in the timing of costs
(expenditure) compared to health beneﬁts (out-
comes). Calculations for discounting are straight-
forward: for each year (
 
n
 
) in the future the value of
costs or beneﬁts is multiplied by (1/(1 
 
+
 
 
 
D
 
)
 
n
 
) where
 
D
 
 is the discount rate [1]. Higher discount rates or
longer delays produce lower net present value. A
constant discount rate produces values that decline
exponentially with time.
The impact of discounting depends on the timing
of costs and health outcomes and therefore the type
of health-care intervention that is evaluated. For
instance, the impact of discounting can be nil or
negligible in hemodialysis programs (since costs and
beneﬁts occur simultaneously) or considerable in
the case of a smoking cessation intervention or
repair of a ruptured aneurysm, when the costs are
upfront and the health beneﬁts occur later [2].
However, the principle of discounting has greatest
application to health-care programs for which most
of the costs are incurred at the present moment and
health beneﬁts occur in the far future. These include
public health programs such as screening and pedi-
atric vaccination [3].
There has been ongoing discussion regarding the
principal choice between uniform discounting,
when the same discount rate is used for costs and
health outcomes, and differential discounting of
costs versus beneﬁts in economic evaluation of
health-care programs. There is also debate regard-
ing the use of constant versus time-varying discount
rates. The purposes of this paper are: to outline the
theoretical arguments regarding uniform or differ-
ential discounting; to provide an overview of the
empiric evidence supporting or opposing both
methods; to consider time-varying discounting; and
to formulate interim recommendations.
 
Theory of Discounting
 
Discounting of health beneﬁts is based on the con-
cept of “positive time preference,” meaning that
society prefers to beneﬁt sooner rather than later.
According to Cairns, positive time preference
reﬂects diminishing marginal utility of beneﬁts; risk
that death will reduce the chance of future con-
sumption; and preference for early rather than late
consumption [4]. There are two main reasons for
being interested in time preference: ﬁrst, to describe
and understand individual decision making about
behaviors that affect health, and secondly, to inform
the choice of social discounting practice as a basis
for rational choices regarding health-care resources.
We discuss discounting in the latter framework.
Uniform discounting, which is used most com-
monly [5] and recommended in most guidelines for
economic analysis [6], is based on the premise that
the impact of time is independent of the nature of
future events (i.e., whether they are costs or out-
comes). The theoretical basis of uniform discount-
ing is two-fold: ﬁrst, avoidance of eternal delay; and
second, consistency. A seminal paper published in
1983 [7] showed that discounting health outcomes
at a lower rate than costs leads to a preference to
defer spending on health care indeﬁnitely, because
programs appear to be more cost-effective if they
are delayed (the “Keeler–Cretin paradox”). The
“consistency” argument accepts that monetary val-
ues should be discounted and argues that costs and
beneﬁts should be discounted at the same rate in
order to be consistent in deﬁning preferences for
health-care programs that cost money and yield
health outcomes at different moments in time [8].
Opponents of uniform discounting argue that
since policy makers have to choose between alter-
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native ways of spending the budget, it is inappro-
priate to fail to invest in health by continually
deferring implementation of health-care services
[9]. The consistency argument assumes that the
relationship between life years and costs remains
independent of time; but this may not necessarily be
the case.
Another argument for not using uniform dis-
counting, and incidentally supporting a view that
health beneﬁts should not be discounted at all [10],
is the possibility of inadvertent double discounting
of beneﬁts [11]. In some instances, health related
outcomes such as quality of life may already be
incorporated into an individual’s time preference,
especially when utility is measured using the time
trade off or standard gamble method [1,12]. If
health outcomes in the future are discounted as
well, the value of future beneﬁts of an intervention
will be underestimated. Double discounting seems
less likely for disease-speciﬁc and surrogate out-
come measures such as reduction in blood pressure,
in which time is generally not explicitly incorpo-
rated. However, economic evaluation deals largely
with generic outcomes such as life years and quality
adjusted life years (QALYs).
Gravelle and Smith [13] have argued recently
that discounting health beneﬁts at a lower rate than
costs takes into account any potential increase in
the future value of health effects. Based on assump-
tions about the pure utility discount rate, the elas-
ticity of marginal utility, the growth rate of income,
and the extent to which health affects income, these
authors estimate that the discount rate on health
effects should be 1% to 3.5% lower than the dis-
count rate on costs [13].
On pragmatic grounds, since discounting dis-
criminates against well-accepted, once-off preven-
tive and other programs that are characterized by
early investment and late health outcome, including
screening and pediatric vaccination [14], some
authors argue that future beneﬁts of such programs
should not be discounted [10,15]. If this principle
were accepted, it might be necessary to develop
detailed guidelines for discounting the beneﬁts of
other types of well-accepted health-care programs
such as lipid screening coupled with (ongoing) lipid
lowering therapy, which are also designed largely
for risk management [16].
 
Should the Discount Rate Vary with Time?
 
There is debate over whether the discount rate
should remain constant over time or diminish with
time. One important argument for using a constant
discount rate is “stationarity;” that is, assuming
that the preference between two equal outcomes
depends only on the absolute time interval between
their occurrence. This is a normative argument,
which disallows inconsistency in decision making.
Variable discounting is based on the idea that
time preference is strong in the near future and
diminishes the further away in time that events take
place [4]. Of course, since each year from the base
year until the year of a cost or health outcome event
is relevant, the cumulative effects of using a high rate
at the ﬁrst few years can still be considerable. For
example, if an ongoing investment in health care,
such as reduction in cardiovascular risk using low
dosage aspirin therapy, entailed an expenditure of
$100 per annum over 15 years, and costs were dis-
counted at 6% in years 1 to 5 and 2% in years 6 to
15, the net present value (NPV) cost would be
$1276. However, if the discount rate were constant
at 6% the NPV cost would be only 20% lower
($1029).
 
Empirical Findings
 
Constant versus Variable Discount Rates
 
In principle, individuals’ time preferences for costs
and beneﬁts could be used as a basis for setting a
social discount rate. A recent, comprehensive over-
view of empiric studies shows that individuals’ time
preferences for health outcomes vary widely [4]. In
general, the older the respondent is, the higher the
time preference and implied discount rate. Although
the study overview suggests that respondents report
considerably lower time preference for their own
health than for the health of others, this conclusion
was not conﬁrmed by the only study designed to
examine this possible difference explicitly [17].
Moreover, in some instances a negative time prefer-
ence was reported for health outcomes, indicating
that individuals might prefer to experience a spell of
ill-health sooner rather than later [18]. Thus, it
seems impossible to draw any general conclusion
about the social discount rate from individuals’ time
preferences.
The main argument supporting variable dis-
counting is an empiric ﬁnding suggesting that indi-
viduals have a high time preference regarding the
near future and a low time preference regarding
events taking place later in time. This ﬁnding
implies the need for a discount rate that declines
with time, or “hyperbolic” discounting [19]. Some
authors have shown that individuals’ implicit dis-
count rates are not always small, positive numbers
that are constant over time and the same for all set-
tings [20]. They suggest that the conventional expo-
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nential discount model may not fully characterize
the time preference held by individuals. Other
authors clearly observed a hyperbolic time-
preference function, reﬂecting decreasing timing
aversion [4,21]. Besides this empiric evidence, a var-
iable discount rate entails fewer assumptions about
individual preferences [22].
 
Uniform versus Differential Discounting
 
There appears to be little direct empiric evidence
supporting either uniform or differential discount-
ing of costs versus health beneﬁts. Several empiric
studies have found that the stationarity axiom
appears to be violated in practice [4]. A recent study
of about 200 students reported a higher positive
time preference for health than for money [23]. This
ﬁnding was conﬁrmed in a study asking future
health-care professionals and policy makers to
choose between different health-care programs on
behalf of society [24]. It is not possible to generalize
these ﬁnding to society as a whole, as the choice of
a younger set of people was likely to lead to age and
wealth bias [25]. Therefore, even if the principle of
differential discounting is accepted, it remains
unclear whether the discount rate for health out-
comes should be higher or lower than for costs.
 
Current Practice
 
So far, the countries that use guidelines for eco-
nomic evaluations in health care support uniform
discounting. Prescribed discount rates vary, mostly
between 3% and 5% [5]. Until recently, in the UK,
health outcomes in pharmacoeconomic studies had
to be discounted using a rate of 1.5% to 2.0% and
the costs using a rate of 6% [6]. However, in the
recent draft NICE-report “Guide to the methods of
technology appraisal” for the reference case an
annual discount rate of 3.5% for both costs and
beneﬁts is prescribed, based on the recommenda-
tions of the UK Treasury [26]. But, more remarka-
bly, a schedule for a declining long-term discount
rate is prescribed, supporting variable discounting.
However, this schedule is too conservative to make
important differences in cost-effectiveness ratios
(3.5% for the ﬁrst 30 years; 3.0% for years 31 to
75; 2.5% for years 76 to 125; 2.0% for years 126 to
200; 1.5% for years 201 to 300; and 1.0% for years
301 and beyond) [27].
US guidelines for economic analysis recommend
that the impact of the discount rate should be sub-
jected to sensitivity analysis in order to determine
the robustness of the study ﬁndings [12]. Although
this recommendation covers the researchers, it may
leave decision makers in a quandary if an analysis is
very sensitive to changes in the discount rate. Ulti-
mately, such uncertainty undermines the credibility
of all economic analysis. Sensitivity analyses should
include zero discount rate because it has been
argued that health policy should reﬂect social values
rather that individual time preferences and that the
time preferences of a stable society are longer than
those of transient individuals within that society
[3,14]. Our overview of both theoretical and empir-
ical arguments shows that it is impossible to decide
whether uniform or differential discounting should
be applied. The different options seem to be more a
matter of belief or disbelief in market forces rather
than empirical science [28,29].
 
Conclusions and Recommendations
 
In conclusion, neither theoretical nor empirical
arguments are adequate to determine an optimal
solution regarding which discounting method and/
or discount rate should be used. At the very least,
standard methods should be used for studies that
are likely to be compared with each other. The most
commonly used method at present (uniform dis-
counting using a constant non-zero discount rate,
commonly 3% or 5%) leads to prioritization of
immediate treatment at the expense of prevention
and works against long-term public health measures
including some evidence-based screening and pedi-
atric vaccination programs. This result could be
attenuated without having to violate the theoretical
principles of uniform discounting by variable dis-
counting of both costs and beneﬁts. Compared to a
constant discount rate over time, a declining dis-
count rate would clearly support health-care pro-
grams with costs now and outcomes in the far
future, or even a next generation. Empirical ﬁndings
support a declining discount rate for health beneﬁts.
Choosing uniform, variable discounting over
current methods requires deﬁnition of a declining
discount function for both beneﬁts and costs. One
immediate question is whether a declining discount
rate is appropriate for costs. Another question is
whether the declining discount function should be
based on individuals’ time preference or on social
time preference. The disadvantage of using individ-
ual time preferences is that they are very situation-
speciﬁc and therefore hard to generalize. Besides
this, life stage and sequence of events may contam-
inate the time preferences measured [30]. Further-
more, time preference for future health outcomes
may vary substantially among disease conditions
[31]. Thus, ideally the discount rate for health-care
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programs should be based on a social time prefer-
ence. However, specifying a social time preference is
above all a normative judgment [11]. Empirical evi-
dence should provide the basis for this normative
decision [23] but it could take years to obtain such
evidence.
We  do  not  have  the  luxury  of  years  to  wait
for empirical ﬁndings. Given the explosive growth
in economic evaluation and its inclusion at a
national policy level in many countries, it is
imperative that consistent principles of discount-
ing are determined both nationally and interna-
tionally. Since countries differ according to
national wealth, arguably the desirable balance
between health-care programs providing short-
versus long-term beneﬁts may also differ consider-
ably; for example, developing countries may
choose to set high discount rates, to focus
national policy on immediate health problems.
Any attempt to impose internationally acceptable
discount rates therefore seems doomed to failure.
Alternatively, national panels could be commis-
sioned for the purpose of setting discount rates
for health economic research. Given that eco-
nomic evaluations should support health-care
decisions at a national level, government agencies
responsible for health-care ﬁnancing and delivery
should play a leading role in such panels and the
process should be as transparent as possible.
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